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Merchant's regulatory noncompliance violates New
Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act
by Lawrence Hughes
In Cox v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454 (N.J
1994), the New Jersey supreme court held that Sears,
Roebuck & Company ("Sears"), by failing to comply
with regulatory provisions governing home improve-
ment work, had engaged in a unlawful practice violating
the state's Consumer Fraud Act ("Act"). Additionally,
the court found that the merchant's violation of the Act
resulted in an ascertainable loss for the plaintiff, thus
entitling him to treble damages, attorney's fees, and
court costs.
Plaintiff sues for breach of contract and Act
violations
In August 1988, William Cox signed a home repair
proposal contract with Sears for kitchen renovations.
Under the contract, Sears agreed to make numerous
kitchen improvements, including installation of new
cabinets, vinyl flooring, a microwave hood and vent, a
garbage disposal, and an extra electrical outlet. Cox
financed the entire cost of $7,295.69 on his Sears credit
card and received the merchant's promise of "satisfac-
tion guaranteed or your money back." Additionally,
when Sears began the home repairs on December 5,
1988, Cox signed an "Authorization for Change of
Specifications" that provided for rewiring and updating
of electrical work at an additional cost of $1,500.
On December 23, 1988, Cox signed a statement
indicating that the improvements made to date had been
completed to his satisfaction. Subsequently however, he
became dissatisfied with Sears' work. During 1989, he
complained to the merchant about defects in the cabi-
nets, the flooring, and the microwave hood. In response
to these complaints, Sears sent a repairman to Cox's
home on at least four occasions. However, after Cox
retained legal counsel in October 1989, Sears made no
further repairs. Cox then sued for breach of contract and
consumer fraud violations under the Act. Sears counter-
claimed for the full contract price of the kitchen repairs.
Upon conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a
verdict for Cox on both the breach of contract and
consumer fraud claims. On the contract claim, the jury
found that Sears had not substantially performed its
contractual obligations. It concluded that Cox was
entitled to damages amounting to the full contract price
of $8,795.69 less $238 for the value of the merchant's
performance. Moreover, the jury found that Sears had
failed to correct the deficiencies in its work and awarded
Cox $6,830 to complete or repair his kitchen. On the
consumer fraud claim, the jury found that Sears had
violated the Act by failing to have competent workmen
install the cabinets, plumbing, and electrical wiring in a
safe manner consistent with existing regulations.
Sears then moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict ("JNOV"). It contended that the conduct charac-
terized by the jury as consumer fraud did not, in
actuality, violate the Act. Initially, the trial court denied
Sears' JNOV motion, awarded treble damages to Cox
according to the provisions of the Act, and dismissed
Sears' counterclaim. However, Sears renewed its motion.
In turn, Cox filed a cross-motion seeking damages,
costs, and attorney's fees totaling $56,840.57.
At this time, the trial court granted Sears' renewed
motion and entered a "no cause of action" in its favor on
both the breach of contract and consumer fraud claims.
However, the court did not disturb an order dismissing
Sears' counterclaim and directed the merchant to
remove charges from Cox's account and the lien on his
house.
On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the trial
court's decision. First, it held that Sears' conduct
constituted a breach of contract. It concluded that the
jury's award of compensatory damages of $6,830 put
Cox in a position equal to the one he would have
enjoyed if the merchant had performed according to the
contract. Second, the court found that Sears had not
engaged in consumer fraud. It stated that a violation of
the Act required an unconscionable practice on the part
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of the merchant. The court reasoned that a breach of
contract, such as the one in the present situation, did not
rise to that level.
Cox appealed this decision to the supreme court of
New Jersey. In the supreme court, Cox confined his
arguments specifically to the consumer fraud claims in
the case and raised no issue as to the contract claim.
Specifically, Cox alleged that Sears' conduct constituted
an unlawful practice under the Act that resulted in an
ascertainable loss. He asserted he was entitled to treble
damages, attorney's fees and costs.
Sears failed to comply with Home Improvement
Practices regulations
In addressing the issue of whether Sears had violated
the Act by engaging in unlawful practices, the supreme
court turned to both the direct language of the Act as
well as its legislative history. It first suggested that the
Act, like other remedial legislation, was designed to be
construed liberally in favor of consumers. The court
noted that the Act specifically authorizes any consumer
who suffers an ascertainable loss from the use or
employment of any "unlawful practice" to bring a
private cause of action. Similarly, it observed that the
Act held a practice unlawful whether or not the mer-
chant had acted in good faith or the consumer had, in
fact, been deceived. Both acts and omissions qualified as
violations of the statute. Additionally, according to the
court, unconscionable commercial practices, character-
ized by a lack of good faith and honesty, also violated
the Act.
The court then specifically examined the nature of the
three general categories of unlawful commercial
practices recognized by the Act: affirmative acts;
knowing omissions; and regulatory violations. First, the
supreme court noted that an affirmative act did not
require intent as an essential element of an alleged
consumer fraud violation. In such a case, the plaintiff
did not need to prove that the defendant intended to
commit the act. Second, the court observed that an
omission required "intent;" an essential element of the
fraud. Here, unlike an affirmative act, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant acted "knowingly" to perpetuate
the fraud. Third, the court recognized that the Act
imposed strict liability on regulatory violations. Accord-
ingly, any failure to comply with the statutory provision
resulted in liability. The court stated that parties subject
to the regulations are assumed to be familiar with them,
and therefore, any failure to comply, regardless of intent
or moral culpability, violates the Act.
In analyzing the issue of whether Sears had violated
the Act, the court concluded that the appellate division
had failed to adequately address Cox's consumer fraud
claim. Specifically, it found that the lower court had
focused solely on whether the merchant had engaged in
an unconscionable commercial practice. Because the
appellate court found that Sears had not committed an
unconscionable practice, it held that there was no
violation of the Act. It did not further examine whether
Sears had committed any of the three categories of
unlawful commercial practices detailed in the Act.
The supreme court, however, stated that such an
interpretation of the Act was too narrow. It suggested
that the Act was not designed to be read in the conjunc-
tive as it had been by the lower court. Rather, the Act
should be read in the disjunctive. In so doing, the Act
may be violated by an unconscionable commercial
practice or by one of the three categories of violative
behavior. Proof of any affirmative act, omission, or
regulatory violation was sufficient to establish that
unlawful conduct occurred.
Reading the Act in the disjunctive, the supreme court
held that Sears had violated the statutory provision. It
suggested that Sears' unlawful conduct involved both
regulatory violations and affirmative acts. For example,
although several permits were required for the home
improvement work to be done in Cox's home, none had
been obtained. Acknowledging that neither statute nor
regulation specifically required Sears to obtain permits
for an owner, the court nevertheless concluded that
Sears began work without checking for permits required
by state law. The court also found that Sears had
violated state law requiring that a home owner receive a
copy of the inspection certificate before final payment is
due and the completion slip is signed. Since no permit
existed for the work on Cox's home, no inspection took
place and no certificate was issued. Finally, the court
found that the evidence supported an inference that
Sears had asked Cox to sign a certificate of completion
before the work had actually been completed.
In finding that Sears' conduct constituted an unlawful
practice in violation of the Act, the court observed that
such regulations governing home improvement work
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had been developed to prevent precisely the poor quality
of work that characterized Sears' performance in this
instance. Furthermore, the supreme court noted that the
Act was intended to protect consumers, such as Cox,
even when substandard workmanship did not approach
the level of unconscionable commercial practice.
Sears' unlawful conduct caused Cox an
ascertainable loss
The New Jersey supreme court then considered
whether Cox was entitled to damages under the Act.
Acknowledging that the Act's remedial purpose is to
compensate a victim for loss, the court stated that the
Act also serves as a deterrent. It provides for punishing
the wrongdoer by awarding treble damages, attorney's
fees and costs. To be entitled to treble damages, how-
ever, a plaintiff must show an "ascertainable loss."
The supreme court held that Sears' failure to comply
with the regulations caused an ascertainable loss for
Cox. It stated that the purpose of the Home Improve-
ment Practices regulations is to protect the consumer
from hazardous or shoddy work. If Sears had obtained
all the required permits before it began work, its
performance would have been subject to periodic
inspections. As such, an inspector would have detected
any substandard performance and required Sears to
correct the deficiencies. Because the inspections did not
occur, deficiencies, such as the unsafe wiring, occurred.
The court found that these deficiencies created an
ascertainable loss for Cox and thus, were compensable
under the Act.
Furthermore, the court dismissed the appellate
division's suggestion that Cox had incurred no loss
because he did not spend money to repair or finish the
work. According to the court, such a construction would
have been contrary to the Act's remedial purpose. It also
rejected the appellate division's suggestion that Cox
failed to incur any loss because he "kept" the kitchen
since it had been installed. It reasoned that Cox had no
other choice because he still owned the house. Similarly,
it found that Cox did not "gain" a kitchen since Cox had
a normal and safe kitchen prior to the renovations. The
supreme court stated that a victim need only estimate
damages within a reasonable degree of certainty to
demonstrate loss; he did not have to actually spend the
money for repairs to be entitled to bring a consumer
fraud claim. According to the supreme court, the trial
court had properly found that Cox adequately demon-
strated the cost of repairs.
State supreme court finds both treble damages and
attorney's fees are appropriate
The court also held that the Act mandates an award of
treble damages and attorney's fees when a consumer
fraud plaintiff proves both an unlawful practice and an
ascertainable loss. According to the court, the proper
measure of Cox's damages was the cost of repairs
trebled, or $20,490.
Moreover, although the contract breach claim was not
before the court, it considered the jury's determination
that the value of Sears' performance was $238 and
credited that amount against the award. A plaintiff is
required, under the "causation" provision of the Act, to
prove that the unlawful consumer fraud caused his loss.
Accordingly, the court entered judgment for Cox in the
amount of $20,252. It held that the contract price was an
incorrect measure of the damages as the fraud occurred
in the course of performance, and not in the actual
contracting of the work.
Additionally, the court acknowledged that the credit
card debt and the lien on the house were losses to Cox
and were properly canceled by the trial court for the
breach of contract. The court, however, held that these
losses had not resulted from Sears' violation of the Act.
Rather, Cox incurred the losses before any fraud
occurred. Because the improper debt and lien were not
caused by Sears' consumer fraud, the court held that
Cox was not entitled to having those damages trebled.
Finally, Cox's award of attorney's fees and costs was
remanded to the trial court for recalculation. The court
indicated that the fee request originally submitted to the
trial court was plainly disproportionate to the resulting
damages. As a result, the trial court would need to
determine fees appropriate to the result.
The judgment of the appellate division was reversed
and remanded to the trial court for reconsideration on
the issues related to the consumer fraud violation.
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